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Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

Infrequent Telephone
Solicitation to a Place of
Business Does Not
Constitute a Violation of
the Massachusetts
Privacy Statute
In Schlesinger v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 409
Mass. 514, 567 N.E.2d 912 (1991),
the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that telephone
solicitations to an attorney at his
office scattered over several years
did not violate the Massachusetts
privacy statute. The court concluded that the telephone solicitation
was neither a "substantial" nor
"serious" interference with the attorney's privacy. The court expressly limited its decision to places of business.
Background
Sales representatives of Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith,
Inc. ("Merrill Lynch"), a securities
firm, phoned Alan J. Schlesinger
("Schlesinger"), an attorney, three
to five times per year on the average in an attempt to sell him
securities. As a result of continued
solicitation, Schlesinger wrote two
letters to Merrill Lynch, one in
1984 and one in 1985, stating that
he did not want to buy securities
and did not want Merrill Lynch's
sales representatives calling his office.
In 1990, Schlesinger sought to
enjoin Merrill Lynch permanently
from calling him at his office to
solicit the purchase of securities.
Merrill Lynch moved for summary
judgment. With no facts in dispute,
the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Schlesinger
and entered a permanent injunction against Merrill Lynch. Merrill
Lynch appealed the order. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the case to its
court and reversed the order to
enjoin Merrill Lynch. The higher
court held Merrill Lynch's action
did not constitute an actionable
invasion under the Massachusetts
privacy statute.
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Analysis
The Massachusetts privacy statute states that "[a] person shall
have a right against unreasonable,
substantial or serious interference
with his privacy. The Superior
Court shall have jurisdiction in
equity to enforce such right and in
connection therewith to award
damages." Schlesinger urged the
court to read the statute literally,
claiming that three separate theories of recovery existed since the
disjunctive pronoun "or" connected the adjectives. Any interference
which was "unreasonable" or
"substantial" or "serious" would
then constitute a violation of the
privacy statute.
The court rejected Schlesinger's
statutory interpretation. The court
instead held that the statute only
prohibited intrusion which were
"substantial" or "serious" if the
interference was unreasonable.
The court asserted that such an
interpretation would avoid illogical and impractical results.
The court noted that not every
intrusion would constitute a legally
cognizable violation of privacy.
Some intrusion was inevitable, especially in a professional setting,
since the expectation and likelihood of receiving telephone solicitations was greater than in a private home. No type of business

that had a telephone number available to the general public could
reasonably expect to be free from
all, or even most, annoying telephone solicitations.
Examining the undisputed facts
in light of its interpretation of the
statute and policy reasoning, the
court held that Merrill Lynch's
intrusion into Schlesinger's privacy was not "substantial" or "serious" within the meaning of the
statute. Merrill Lynch's representatives only called three to five
times a year. The calls were brief
and made pursuant to a legitimate
business purpose and did not constitute a pattern of harassment.
Schlesinger's policy of taking all
calls further lessened his expectation of privacy with regard to
phone solicitations. The court
found that Schlesinger reasonably
should expect to receive calls at his
office from people trying to sell
him products or services such as
office supplies or billing services
during business hours. Thus, the
court concluded that Merrill Lynch
had not violated Massachusetts's
privacy statute. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the trial court's order enjoining Merrill Lynch from
soliciting business from Schlesinger at his law office.
Suzanne Kuzmenka

CONSUMER UPDATE
MINIMUMS FOR PROFESSIONAL PORTFOLIO
MANAGEMENT SERVICES REDUCED
Attorneys who specialize in estate planning, trusts, wills, pensions and profit sharing plans can now recommend professional,
financial portfolio management services to more clients because the
portfolio minimums have been lowered by many money management companies.
In the past, attorneys, individuals and corporations were blocked
from using sophisticated portfolio managers because the managers
required a minimum portfolio of $1 to $5 million in investable
assets. The old minimum is far beyond the scope of many
individual estates, profit sharing or pension plans. In 1986, the
Department of Labor reported only 337,000 pension plans with
assets between $100,000 to $1 million dollars.
Now companies such as Shearson Lehman Brothers have
lowered the portfolio minimum to $100,000 (some even as low as
$50,000). Many of the money management programs provide due
diligence protection, match risk-return philosophies, monitor results quarterly, carry SIPC protection and charge an annual wrap
fee that eliminates fear of churning accounts for commission.
Importantly, professional money management enhances the attorney-client relationship and reduces fiduciary responsibility.
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guilty of deception and fraud.
Even in our "civilized" society of today, too many thumbs
are being held over too many
holes. To date, no one has been
able to legislate or regulate the
personality and techniques of all
salesmen, either in the field of
trade or politics.
As the tale of "The Hole in the
Leopard Skin" points out, the BBB
believes that credibility in advertising is paramount to customer
acceptance of advertising as a
whole and of the business community, as well.
Charitable Solicitations
The BBB's Charitable Solicitations program monitors charities,
based upon twenty-three different
standards including how the funds
will be utilized for the cause intended, as well as what percentage
of the dollars collected will go to
support the actual cause. The Bureau's role in this self-regulatory
program is to encourage businesses
and the general public to "give, but
give wisely."
The BBB Inquiry Center
Information on charities, as well
as the information contained on
any company in the BBB files, is
available by telephone from the
Bureau's Inquiry Center. Included
in the information made available
to any caller are the complaints
filed against the company, as well
as any government actions which
have been filed for matters regarding the company's customer relations practices. The Bureau's Inquiry Center and the Charitable
Solicitations Program are also
available to anyone at no cost. The
programs were established to protect potential buyers and givers
from dealing with questionable
companies, so that their funds are
channeled to responsible organizations within the structure of the
free enterprise system.
The BBB wants each person to
have at their ready reference, adequate information to make knowledgeable and responsible buying
and or giving decisions. Caveat
venditor, let the seller beware and
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the buyer be informed, has now
firmly replaced caveat emptor.
This is the best method of control
for the marketplace; a knowledgeable person will realize that, when
something seems too good to be
true, it usually is.
Self-Regulation Promotes
Customer Satisfaction
Looking forward to the decade
of the 1990s, I envision the Better
Business Bureau as the major
source of resolution in buyer-seller
disputes. Self-regulation is the
means by which disputes are fairly
and efficiently resolved. The future
of self-regulatory activities cannot
be overstated, as the costs and time
involved in litigation continue to
increase, making it difficult for the
average consumer to have their
product and or service problem
resolved by going to court.
Self-regulation, through the
BBB, precludes thousands of consumer complaints from flooding
the already overburdened court
system. These complaints, it
should be noted, are generally not
as involved and can be expeditiously handled through the BBB's
Alternative Dispute Resolution
system. Businesses recognize that a
satisfied customer is a repeat customer. A recent TARP study reported each dissatisfied customer
tells approximately nine other people about her unhappiness with a
company.
The Bureau's Auto Line and
Care Programs are designed to
encourage consumer complaints
because, according to the TARP
study, for every complaint a company receives from one of its customers, there are twenty-six other
complaints that go unreported.
Nine out of ten silent critics will
take their business to a competitor.
A Roper Reports study notes that
the BBB is the mechanism by
which complaints should be handled by businesses because dissatisfied customers turn to the BBB
for resolution of their complaints
three times as often as any other
agency.
Government involvement in
buyer-seller issues is needed when
self-regulatory procedures are not
available to address the problems
and to enforce the law. Most busi-

nesses are now more sensitive to
the needs of the customer and want
to hear from their dissatisfied customers. Therefore, businesses are
willing to put forth the money and
effort needed to resolve consumer
problems. Fortune Magazine recently termed the 1990s, the decade of customer satisfaction,
when it explored the many ways
businesses were working to meet
the needs of their customers.
Better Business Bureaus are being asked to do more in the alternative dispute resolution field. For
example, in Buffalo the BBB handles the neighborhood justice center disputes under contract with
the city and county. Similarly in
Dallas, the Better Business Bureau
is handling buyer-seller complaints
filed with the city against companies in an effort to deregulate the
complaint handling process in that
area. The BBB is regularly being
written into consent orders by state
attorneys general and other governmental agencies as a means of
resolving current and or future
disputes between consumers and a
specific business.
Self-regulation and government
regulation are clearly distinct; yet,
many of the people involved in
each of these disciplines recognize
that by working together they can
perform a better service for the
people in their area at a lower total
cost.
I believe that self-regulation is
the moral basis of any regulation.
Self-regulation promotes a responsibility on the part of the business
community. Self-regulation is really business ethics put into daily
practice for the benefit of both the
buyer and seller. The free enterprise system of the United States is
based on the self-regulation principle and will continue to prosper if
the business community understands and accepts its ethical responsibilities in the marketplace so
the consumer-you and I-will be
able to obtain quality goods and
services at a fair price. At the same
time, consumers must accept the
role of being responsible shoppers
by comparing before a purchase is
made.
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